Use of a game theory model to simulate competition in next generation networks by Pereira, João Paulo
  
Use of a Game Theory model to simulate competition in 
Next Generation Networks 
João Paulo Ribeiro Pereira 
 
School of Technology and Management, Polytechnic Institute of Bragança (IPB) 
5301-857 Bragança, Portugal 
jprp@ipb.pt 
Abstract. With game theory, we want to understand the effects of the 
interaction between the different players defined in our business case - Next 
generation access networks (NGNs). In the proposed games, the profit 
(outcome) of each operator (player) will be dependent not only on their actions, 
but also on the actions of the other operators in the market. This paper analyzes 
the impact of the price (retail and wholesale) variations on several output 
results: players’ profit, consumer surplus, welfare, costs, service adoption, and 
so on. For that, two price-setting games are played. Players’ profits and Net 
Present Value (NPV) are used as the payoff for the players in the games 
analyzed. We assume that two competing Fiber to the home networks 
(incumbent operator and new entrant) are deployed in two different areas. For 
the game-theoretic model, we also propose an adoption model use in a way that 
reflects the competition between players and that the variation of the services 
prices of one player has an influence on the market share of all players. In our 
model we also use the Nash equilibrium to find equilibrium - Proposed tools 
include a module to search the Nash equilibrium in the game. 
Keywords: Access Networks, NGNs, Game Theory, Techno-economic Model. 
1   Introduction 
In a real competitive market situation, competitors need to adapt their strategy to 
face/react the strategies from other players. The interaction between the several 
market players can be modeled using game theory. The main objective of a game-
theory model is providing a mathematical description of a social situation in which 
two or more players interact, and every player can choose from different strategies. 
[1] define game theory as a collection of mathematical models formulated to study 
situations of conflict and cooperation, and concerned with finding the best actions for 
individual decision makers. [2] argue that game theory is a theory of decision making 
under conditions of uncertainty and interdependence.  
To better understand the effects of interaction (interaction between players can 
consist of competition or cooperation) between different players, we build a new 
model, in which the outcome for each player will be depending on his own actions but 
also on the actions of the other players. The players compete for some good or 
reward, and often in business cases, the customer will be the aim of the competition 
[3, 4]. The object of study in game theory is the game, where there are at least two 
players, and each player can choose amongst different actions (often referred to as 
strategies). The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game - 
the collection of numerical payoffs (one to each player). So, the game has three main 
key parts [5]: a) a set of participants; b) each player has a set of options for how to 
behave; we will refer to these as the player’s possible strategies; and c) for each 
choice of strategies, each player receives a payoff that can depend on the strategies 
selected by everyone (in our model, the payoff  to each player is the profit each 
provider gets). 
After the calculation of the several payoffs, game theoretic concepts can be used 
for retrieving the most likely (set of) interactions between the players [4]. There are 
several different equilibrium-definitions of which probably the Nash equilibrium is 
the most commonly known - A broad class of games is characterized by the Nash 
equilibrium solution. In 1950, John Nash demonstrated that finite games always have 
a Nash equilibrium, also called a strategic equilibrium [1]. A Nash equilibrium is a 
list of strategies, one for each player, which has the property that no player can 
unilaterally change his strategy and get a better payoff - each player’s strategy is an 
optimal response to the other players’ strategies. Even when there are no dominant 
strategies, it should be expected that players use strategies that are the best responses 
to each other. This is the central concept of noncooperative game theory and has been 
a focal point of analysis since then. For example, if player 1 chooses strategy S1 and 
player 2 chooses S2, the pair of strategies (S1 and S2) is a Nash equilibrium if S1 is 
the best response to S2, and S2 is the best response to S1. So, if the players choose 
strategies that are best responses to each other, then no player has an incentive to turn 
to an alternative strategy, and the system is in a kind of equilibrium, with no force 
pushing it toward a different outcome [5]. 
2   Model overview 
One of the main goals of regulated access is to prevent the incumbent from abusing a 
dominant market position [6]. It is necessary to make sure that alternative operators 
can compete effectively. It is fundamental that incumbent operators give access to the 
civil works infrastructure, including its ducts, and to give wholesale broadband access 
(bitstream) to the local loop (be it based on copper, new fiber, etc.). However, at the 
same time, alternative operators should be able to compete on the basis of the 
wholesale broadband input while they progressively roll out their own NGAN 
infrastructure. In some areas, especially with higher density, alternative operators 
have rolled out their own infrastructure and broadband competition has developed. 
This would result in more innovation and better prices to consumers [7]. 
Many European incumbents and some alternative operators are starting to plan and 
in some cases deploy large-scale fiber investments, which has resulted in important 
changes for European fixed-line markets [8]. Many Europeans incumbents and some 
alternative operators are starting to plan and in some cases deploy large scale fiber 
investments, which results in important changes for European fixed line markets [8]. 
The risk of alternative operators will take longer to deploy their own infrastructure 
and will give to incumbents the possibility to create new monopolies at the access 
level. The technologies used and the pace of development vary from country to 
country according to existing networks and local factors. Based on the different 
underlying cost conditions of entry and presence of alternative platforms, it may be 
more appropriate to geographically differentiate the access regulatory regime.  
This work focuses the development of a tool that simulates the impact of retail and 
wholesale price variation on provider’s profit, welfare, consumer surplus, costs, 
market served, network size, etc.  
In the proposed model, “Retail Prices” represents the set of retail prices charged by 
providers for each service to consumers in a given region/area. We assume that retail 
providers cannot price discriminate in the retail market. “Wholesale Prices” represents 
the prices that one provider charges to other provider to allow the later to use the 
infrastructure to reach consumers. We assume that wholesale price can be different in 
each area. Also, we assume that when a provider buys infrastructure access in the 
wholesale market, it cannot resell to another provider. The shared infrastructure 
consists of: conduit and collocation facilities; cable leasing (dark fiber requires active 
equipment to illuminate the fiber – for example repeaters); and bit stream.  
For example, one or several wholesaler providers can sell Layer 0 access (conduit 
and collocation facilities) and/or Layer 1 access (cable leasing) or Layer 2 access 
(bitstream – network layer unbundling – UNE loop) only to retail providers and not 
directly to consumers. UNE loop is defined as the local loop network element that is a 
transmission facility between the central office and the point of demarcation at an 
end-user’s premises. Table 1:shows an example of a scenario with two regions, two 
providers, two services, and one infrastructure layers. 
Table 1: Structure of a scenario 
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 Provider 1 Provider 2 
 Retail price Wholesale price Retail price Wholesale price 
 
Serv. 1 Serv. 2 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 
Serv. 1 Serv. 2 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 
 Layer 0 Layer 0 Layer 0 Layer 0 
St1 Pr(S1,V1) Pr(S2,V1) Pw(L0,V1) Pw(L0,V1)) Pr(S1,V1) Pr(S2,V1) Pw(L0,V1) Pw(L0,V1)) 
       St2 Pr(S1,V1) Pr(S2,V1)) Pw(L0,V1) Pw(L0,V1) Pr(S1,V1) Pr(S2,V1)) Pw(L0,V1) Pw(L0,V2) 
       Stn …               
 
Each line corresponds to a strategy of prices (St1, St2, Stn), and for each strategy 
the tool calculates the results (columns at the right side of the previous table). To 
calculate the number of strategies required, we use the following formula: 
 
 
(1) 
 
Where: TS – Total strategies; TVS – Total values to simulate; TProv – Total 
providers; TServ – Total services; TReg – Total regions; TLay – Total layers 
3   Input parameter assumptions 
As we can see in Figure 1: , our tool has several input parameters, computes several 
results and finds the strategies that are Nash equilibrium. The results are represented 
in tables and graphics.  
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Figure 1:  Game-theoretic model structure 
3.1 Fixed and marginal costs 
In our model, we assume that providers incur in fixed costs to build network 
infrastructure to provide access to a region and in marginal costs to connect each 
consumer separately.  
The fixed costs are detailed by provider, region and infrastructure layer (see Table 
2:). So, we assume that the fixed costs of each provider can be different in different 
regions - for example, if a provider has part of the infrastructure deployed in a region, 
and in the other is required all the infrastructure, the costs are different [6].  
Table 2: Structure of fixed costs input parameter 
Region1 Region2 … Region r 
Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 … Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 
Provider 1  Cf(P1,R1,L0) Cf(P1,R1,L1) Cf(P1,R1,L2) Cf(P1,R2,L0) Cf(P1,R2,L1) Cf(P1,R2,L2) …    
Provider 2 Cf(P2,R1,L0) Cf(P2,R1,L1) Cf(P2,R1,L2) Cf(P2,R2,L0) Cf(P2,R2,L1) Cf(P2,R2,L2) …    
… … … … … … … … … … … 
Provider p       …    
For marginal costs, we assume that each provider has different costs for 
deployment in each infrastructure layer. In each region, the marginal cost could be 
different for each provider depending of the total number of subscribers – scale 
economies. This means that the marginal cost can decrease when a specific provider 
buys higher quantities of equipment, cable, etc. (see Table 3:). 
Table 3: Structure of marginal costs input parameter 
 
Region 1 Region 2 … 
Total Consumers TotCons1 TotCons2 TotCons3 TotCons4 TotCons1 TotCons2 TotCons3 TotCons4 … 
Provider 
1 
L0 Cm(P1,R1,L0,V1) Cm(P1,R1,L0,V2) Cm(P1,R1,L0,V3) Cm(P1,R1,L0,V4) Cm(P1,R2,L0,V1) Cm(P1,R2,L0,V2) Cm(P1,R2,L0,V3) Cm(P1,R2,L0,V4) 
 L1 Cm(P1,R1,L1,V1) Cm(P1,R1,L1,V2) Cm(P1,R1,L1,V3) Cm(P1,R1,L1,V4) Cm(P1,R2,L1,V1) Cm(P1,R2,L1,V2) Cm(P1,R2,L1,V3) Cm(P1,R2,L1,V4) 
 L2 Cm(P1,R1,L2,V1) Cm(P1,R1,L2,V2) Cm(P1,R1,L2,V3) Cm(P1,R1,L2,V4) Cm(P1,R2,L2,V1) Cm(P1,R2,L2,V2) Cm(P1,R2,L2,V3) Cm(P1,R2,L2,V4) 
 
Provider 
2 
L0 Cm(P2,R1,L0,V1) Cm(P2,R1,L0,V2) Cm(P2,R1,L0,V3) Cm(P2,R1,L0,V4) Cm(P2,R2,L0,V1) Cm(P2,R2,L0,V2) Cm(P2,R2,L0,V3) Cm(P2,R2,L0,V4) 
 L1 Cm(P2,R1,L1,V1) Cm(P2,R1,L1,V2) Cm(P2,R1,L1,V3) Cm(P2,R1,L1,V4) Cm(P2,R2,L1,V1) Cm(P2,R2,L1,V2) Cm(P2,R2,L1,V3) Cm(P2,R2,L1,V4) 
 L2 Cm(P2,R1,L2,V1) Cm(P2,R1,L2,V2) Cm(P2,R1,L2,V3) Cm(P2,R1,L2,V4) Cm(P2,R2,L2,V1) Cm(P2,R2,L2,V2) Cm(P2,R2,L2,V3) Cm(P2,R2,L2,V4) 
 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
3.2 Pricing strategy 
Both suppliers and consumers aim at maximizing the benefit or surplus they receive 
[9]. The suppliers aim at maximizing the profit, which is the difference between 
revenue and cost. The consumers aim at maximizing the consumer surplus, which is 
the difference between consumer value (also known as utility or maximum 
willingness to pay) and price. As discussed, some of the factors that are important in 
the design of pricing scheme include technology risks, availability of resources, 
competition, supplier and consumer behavior, price discrimination and regulation. 
3.2.1 Definition of the variation in retail prices 
The definition of retail prices and trend was explained previously. For the game-
theoretic tool, we need to define the variation in retail prices which we want to 
simulate. So, for each service, we define the price values we wish to simulate - the 
tool gives the possibility to simulate n values. In the example presented in the next 
table, the tool simulates the results obtained when the value of service 1 is Pr 
S1,Value1, Pr S1,Value1, Pr S1,Value1, and Pr S1,Value1 for all players (providers). 
Table 4: Variation values for retail prices 
Value 1 Value 2 Value 3 Value 4 … 
Value for Service 1 Pr S1, Value1 Pr S1, Value2 Pr S1, Value3 Pr S1, Value4  
Value for Service 2 Pr S2, Value1 Pr S2, Value2 Pr S2, Value3 Pr S2, Value4  
… 
    
 
3.3 Definition of the variation in wholesale prices 
For wholesale prices, we define the variation in wholesale price layers that we want to 
simulate. Similarly, for retail price, for each layer we define the price values we wish 
to simulatethe tool gives the possibility to simulate n values. 
Table 5: Variation values for wholesale prices 
Value 1 Value 2 Value 3 Value 4 … 
Value for Layer 0 Pw L0, Value1 Pw L0, Value2 Pw L0, Value3 Pw L0, Value4  
Value for Layer 1 Pw L1, Value1 Pw L1, Value2 Pw L1, Value3 Pw L1, Value4  
Value for Layer 2 Pw L2, Value1 Pw L2, Value2 Pw L2 ,Value3 Pw L2, Value4  
 
For infrastructure, the definition of which layer or combination of layers we would 
like to simulate is also required: conduit, cable or Bit-Stream (Conduit + Cable + 
Equipment). 
4.   Simulation model (modeling competition) 
The simulation model can be sub-divided into seven main parts: retail and wholesale 
modeling, calculate total costs (build and lease infrastructure), calculate revenues 
(retail and wholesale market), calculate profit, calculate consumer surplus, and 
calculate welfare.  
In retail modeling, we assume that consumers choose the service from the provider 
with the lowest price. However, consumers only buy a service if the price is less than 
their willingness to pay. This means that if there are two or more providers, 
consumers choose the service from the provider with the lowest price. Moreover, if 
several providers have the same price, we use the provider ranking. We also assume 
that consumers have a different willingness to pay for each service. First, the tool 
identify the retail provider for each service in the regions in study using information 
from providers, retail prices, consumer willingness to pay, and provider rank. Next, as 
we know which provider will provide each service, we can compute the total 
subscribers per region, service, and provider (market segment).  
 
Figure 2:  Retail market modeling 
In wholesale modeling, we determine the infrastructure chosen by each provider to 
reach consumers. To model the wholesale market, we assume that if a provider does 
not have infrastructure, it uses the infrastructure (or part of the infrastructure, such as 
a conduit cable) of another provider if the price charged to access it is lower than the 
cost to build an infrastructure. To achieve that goal, the algorithm uses information 
about wholesale prices, fixed costs, and marginal costs to identify the best solution 
(lease or build infrastructure) for each region and service.  
 Figure 3:  Wholesale market modeling 
4.3 Calculate total costs (build and lease infrastructures) 
The calculation of the total costs incurred by each provider is divided in two main 
parts: wholesale costs and build-out costs. As sees in next figure, we use the 
wholesale infrastructure design computed previously and the wholesale prices 
charged by the infrastructure owners (i.e., payments that a specific provider gives to 
the infrastructure owner to buy wholesale access in order to reach consumers). We 
assume that the network owner charges the same wholesale price to all providers. 
To calculate the build-out costs, the algorithm uses the fixed and marginal costs 
parameters with region parameters to compute the total costs required to deploy an 
entire or part of an infrastructure. The total number of consumers per region and per 
provider is also used to add the effect of economies of scale. When a provider buys a 
large quantity of equipment, the probability of attaining better prices is higher. 
 
Figure 4:  Total costs calculation 
4.4 Calculate revenues, profit, consumer surplus and total welfare 
To compute the total revenues per provider, we first calculate the revenues from the 
retail market.  
 Figure 5:  Revenues calculation 
These are primarily based on the retail prices charged by providers and the total 
number of consumers per provider and services computed in the retail modeling. 
Revenues from the retail market are equal to the product of the retail price of each 
service and the total customers of the service. 
Next, we calculate the revenues from the wholesale market. The wholesale 
infrastructure provides information about the number of access leased. The revenues 
of a provider are the sum of all payments received from other providers that use its 
infrastructure to reach consumers. Finally, the total revenues of a given provider are 
the sum of the revenues from the retail and the wholesale market. After computing the 
total costs and revenues in the previous algorithms, the formula we use to calculate 
total profit is the difference between total revenues and total profit. The total profit is 
also used in the identification of the Nash equilibrium strategies. 
 
Figure 6:  Profit calculation 
Consumer surplus (CS) is the difference between the total amount that consumers 
are willing and able to pay for each service and the total amount that they actually pay 
(i.e., the retail price). So, the CS of a specific market is the sum of the individual 
consumer surpluses of all those customers in the market who actually bought the 
service at the going retail price [10]. To compute CS, we need information about 
consumer willingness to pay and retail prices for each service. 
Total welfare is computed on base of the formula: welfare = consumer surplus + 
total profit. Like the previously calculations, the CS and the profit are computed in the 
algorithms presented above.  
5   Results 
Based on the numerous input parameters described, our tool computes several results, 
including profit, consumer surplus, welfare, market served, network size, costs, and 
revenues, and finds the strategies that are Nash equilibriums. The results are saved in 
text files (see Figure 7: ).  
 
Figure 7:  Structure of the results produced (output from tool) 
Figure 7: show the structure of the results that correspond to a scenario of two 
providers, two retail services, two infrastructure layers, and two regions. Each line is a 
strategy. We consider a strategy to be a set of retail and wholesale prices. For each 
combination of prices, the tool calculates profit, CS, welfare, market served, network 
size, and total costs.  
In addition to the results presented in the tables, the tool creates several types of 
graphs. Next figures show two examples of the graphs produced. The graph shows the 
impact on profit of both providers and variation in wholesale and retail prices. This 
representation gives users a tool to gain a better perspective of the results. 
  
 
Figure 8:  Profit region 1 (retail price) - example 
6   Conclusion 
Sensitivity analysis shows the impact that changes in a certain parameter will have on 
the model’s outcome.  As the interaction between all the players is important, we put 
the competition component in the business case. With game theory, we want to 
understand the effects of the interaction between the different players defined in our 
business case.  In the proposed games, the profit (outcome) of each operator (player) 
will be dependent not only on their actions, but also on the actions of the other 
operators in the market. 
The impact of the price (retail and wholesale) variations on several output results: 
players’ profit, consumer surplus, welfare, costs, service adoption, and so on.  For 
that, two price-setting games are played.  Players’ profits and NPV are used as the 
payoff for the players in the games analyzed. 
In our model we also use the Nash equilibrium to find equilibrium.  Proposed tools 
include a module to search the Nash equilibrium in the game. One strategy is a Nash 
equilibrium when both competitors play their best strategy related to the other 
strategies selected (players know each other’s strategy in advance). 
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